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Abstract— We present a user-centric and decentralized 
digital identity system that allows anyone to easily benefit from 
an enriched digital identity made of multi-purpose and multi-
origin attributes. It increases usability by the elimination of 
user passwords. It also makes this digital identity highly 
trustworthy both for the user (in terms of privacy and 
sovereignty) and the service provider who requires highly 
certified information about the user being enrolled to and/or 
authenticated on its services. We built our system based on the 
Universal Authentication Framework specified by the FIDO 
Alliance and the data model proposed by the W3C Verifiable 
Credentials WG. The whole system has been implemented in a 
banking scenario. 
Keywords—Federated Identity Management, FIDO UAF, 
Verifiable credentials 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Registration and authentication processes on websites 
have been significantly simplified by federated identity 
management systems, which allow single sign-on. A central 
actor, the Identity Provider (IdP), centralizes all the identity 
attributes of each of its users and provides them with a single 
authentication process they can use to identify and 
authenticate to any service on the internet that is federated 
with the IdP. Based on web-based standard protocols (e.g. 
SAML [1], OpenID Connect [2]), this process replaces the 
tedious task of manually declaring an identity by registering 
at each service provider (SP), with an automatic exchange of 
identity information between the IdP and the SP. Identity 
federation also simplifies user authentication in a password 
based world, since the user only authenticates to the IdP, 
thereby reducing the number of credentials that need to be 
remembered. 
However, today’s federated identity management (FIM) 
systems have a significant structural weakness, namely, the 
placement of the IdP at the centre of the identity ecosystem. 
First, the trust model requires the IdP to trust the SP to 
preserve the privacy of the user’s identity attributes that it is 
asserting, and the SP to trust that the IdP is the authoritative 
source of (all of) the user’s identity attributes. Both of these 
trust requirements are unreasonable. No single IdP is the 
authoritative source of all a user’s identity attributes, and 
users may want to present their identity attributes to SPs that 
IdPs do not fully trust. Secondly, the IdPs are the center of 
the identity eco-system, and issue short-lived identity 
assertions [1] or tokens [2] on-demand to trusted SPs. 
Consequently, they know which SPs the user is visiting and 
when, which allows them to track the user. In addition, 
besides violating the user’s privacy, it also introduces a 
severe security vulnerability as the recent Facebook hack [3] 
highlighted. This allowed the attackers to access all the 
user’s accounts at all the SP web sites that trusted Facebook 
as the user’s IdP. Since IdPs, like Facebook, store a huge 
amount of information about lots of users, such attacks have 
a big impact. Finally, the assurance SPs can have on identity 
attributes is very low since attributes are mostly always self-
asserted by the user when she creates/updates her account at 
the IdP. This stifles the digitalisation of services and 
transactions. There are a few examples of IdPs that certify 
the integrity of users’ attributes, such as universities, and 
France Connect. However, these identity federations are 
restricted to academia or French administration offices only 
(that brings us back to the first issue). 
Our hypothesis is that 1) placing the user at the centre of 
the identity ecosystem rather than the IdP, and 2) splitting 
omnipotent IdPs into small and specialized Attribute 
Authorities (AA) or Issuers is both more secure and more 
privacy protecting, and consequently will become the 
predominant identity management architecture of the future. 
Our hypothesis is supported by the “plastic card model” (e.g. 
association membership cards, scuba diving accreditation 
cards, ID cards, etc.), which allows the user to apply for 
plastic cards from multiple issuers, keep them in a wallet, 
and then present them to whomsoever they choose, when 
they choose. This model is already ubiquitous in the physical 
world, and we propose to use it in the electronic world. This 
architecture allows the user to: 
1) choose which card issuers to enroll with, 
2) choose which service providers to present her cards to, 
3) not inform the card issuers prior to use of her cards, 
4) choose which cards to use, from those accepted by the 
service provider, 
5) update her personal details with the issuers and inform 
them to revoke one of her cards. 
As a consequence, there is a need for a new FIM system 
that allows users to generate on-demand identities that 
contain only the necessary information by aggregating 
validated identity attributes from different attribute 
authorities. In addition, attribute authorities should neither be 
able to control the disclosure of users’ attributes, nor track 
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them. Hence, our research follows the philosophy of the self-
sovereign identity paradigm [4]. Although there is no 
consensus on the self-sovereign identity definition [5], W3C 
[6] explains that "in a self-sovereign system, users exist 
independently from services. In contrast, in a service-centric 
system, users are tightly bound to a particular service." As a 
consequence, in a self-sovereign identity system, the user 
must be central to the administration of its identity. 
We present in this article a user-friendly identity system 
that places the user at the centre, using the new W3C 
Verifiable Credentials (VC) standard [7]. The architecture 
places the user at the center of the FIM eco-system rather 
than the IdP, and the trust model only requires the SP to trust 
the IdP. However, currently the W3C is only standardizing 
the data model for VCs and no protocols are being proposed. 
We have built a VC eco-system based on an enhanced 
FIDO UAF protocol. Our identity system is highly secure 
and privacy protecting with the following properties. 
Availability is achieved because the user will be able to 
present her credentials to the SPs of her choosing at any 
time, and the SP should always be able to validate them. 
Confidentiality is respected because the credentials will 
only be visible to third parties (SPs) chosen by the user. 
Integrity since the SP will be able to check the integrity of 
all credentials presented to it i.e. they are current, not 
modified, and all belong to the presenter. Finally, we 
followed the Privacy-by-design principle. In our system, the 
user should not have to present more credentials to an SP 
than are needed to access its resources (selective 
disclosure/data minimization/least privileges). She should 
consent to the release of her credentials (making our system 
compliant with the European GDPR), and she should not be 
trackable through the use of her credentials, except in cases 
of abuse. We implemented the whole system and proved its 
efficiency in an online banking registration scenario. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section II 
presents the related works. Section III describes the 
underlying technologies. In section IV, we describe our 
identity management system called Universal Authentication 
and Authorization Framework. We present the conceptual 
and implementation architectures. In section V, we illustrate 
its use in a bank scenario. Finally, section VI concludes and 
highlights future works. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
The two main federated identity management protocols 
are SAMLv2 [1] and OpenID Connect (OIDC) [2]. As used 
in the Shibboleth implementation, SAMLv2 is typically used 
for identity federations between organizations where users 
are employees of the IdP. This gives the IdP organisation 
complete control over the attributes disclosed to the SP. 
Also, as operated by the academic community, it requires 
strong trust relations between the IdPs and the SPs, who sign 
agreements in order to join the federation. OIDC fits more 
with the concept of user-centric federated identity 
management on the web because (theoretically) users can 
choose which attributes will be revealed to the SPs. In 
practice, however, users are given a ‘take it or leave it' menu 
by the IdP and have to agree to the release of all of the 
attributes that the SP requests. Usually, the SP retrieves the 
user's attributes directly from the IdP via a backchannel, 
allowing the IdP to track users. Finally, there exist 
proprietary protocols that are interoperable with OIDC (e.g. 
Facebook Connect, Google+ sign in, etc.). However, in 
addition to the OIDC weaknesses, these protocols constrain 
the user to one central IdP per session (e.g. Facebook or 
Google). Solid (https://github.com/solid/) led by Tim 
Berners-Lee is proposing to build a decentralized social 
application based on Linked Data principles where 
authentication is done by WebID-TLS. Although this 
approach complies with the self-sovereign principles, Solid 
cannot provide certified identity attributes. 
Many new approaches propose to build a FIM system 
following the self-sovereign objective on top of blockchains 
[8,9], such as ShoCard, Sovrin, UPort, OneName, BitID, 
ID.me or IDchainZ. A first strategy consists in digitizing 
paper-based credentials and publishing a hash on a public 
distributed ledger. For instance, in ShoCard 
(https://shocard.com/), users scan their existing paper-based 
trusted credentials (e.g. their passport) using the device’s 
camera and extract attributes by applying an optical character 
recognition technique. A signed hash of this data, called 
ShoCardID, is stored in Bitcoin transactions. In a second 
step, this data has to be certified by an IdP and the hash of 
the certificate is published in the Bitcoin ledger. This 
certification task is similar to the registration process in 
X.509 PKI systems. All the attributes are stored in the users' 
mobile devices. A ShoCard server can store symmetrically 
encrypted certifications (called envelopes) in case the user 
loses its device. A relying party can validate an identity after 
the user has provided the symmetric key and the envelope 
reference from the ShoCard server. This solution has several 
drawbacks. First, ShoCard has privacy weaknesses. The hash 
of the users' identity attributes is publicly available, and the 
ShoCard server may be able to associate a particular 
ShoCardID with requests made by relying parties and then 
technically track users similarly to SAML or OIDC IdPs. 
Secondly, Bitcoin transactions take on average 10 minutes to 
be mined and waiting for six additional blocks is 
recommended for the settlement of a transaction [8]. This 
implies users will have to wait at least one hour before being 
able to use their certified identities. This constraint limits the 
usage of ShoCard to scenarios requiring only predefined 
identities (where attributes are known in advance) since it is 
not possible to create identities in real time. Finally, the 
central role of the ShoCard server raises the question of the 
sustainability of users’ identities if the company ceases to 
exist. 
Sovrin (https://sovrin.org) has developed another strategy 
that relies on a permissioned-ledger based blockchain to 
store identity records. An identity record is a transaction on 
the Sovrin Ledger that describes a Sovrin Entity that may 
include Public Keys, Service Endpoints, Claim Definitions, 
Public Claims, and Proofs. Identity Records are Public Data. 
Only trusted nodes, called stewards that satisfy the Sovrin 
Foundation Agreement can add identity records to the 
permissioned-ledger. Specific software programs, called 
Agents, act on behalf of the entity to interact with other 
Agents or with the Sovrin Ledger. There are two types of 
Agents: Edge Agents that run on a local device (e.g. on a 
user's mobile device), and Cloud Agents that run remotely on 
a server or cloud hosting service. Credentials are exchanged 
between Agents using a proprietary P2P-based protocol 
while the format of the credentials aligns with the W3C 
Verifiable Credentials standard. This solution fits more with 
our objectives and using a blockchain as a root of trust is 
interesting. However, the Sovrin approach suffers some 
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drawbacks. First, users could run their Cloud agents on their 
own servers, but more likely, they will delegate this task to 
specialized intermediary agencies [8]. As a consequence, a 
lot of user information will be available to the agencies. 
Moreover, the Sovrin protocol is proprietary. A better 
approach is to adopt standards around which an ecosystem 
can be developed. In the same vein, Sovrin is not compatible 
with other FIM technologies. Confining the system can 
impact the adoption of the solution. 
Last but not least, none of the current blockchain-based 
FIM solutions have considered usability and user 
understanding of privacy implications [8,10] whilst all these 
approaches advocate the need for user control. Finally, as 
pointed out by Yael Grauer [11], “multiple startups in 
decentralized sovereign identity solutions are competing to 
be the key players in this space. Confining users within a 
particular blockchain contradicts the main idea of self-
sovereign identity”. 
III. THE MAIN TECHNOLOGIES 
A. W3C Verifiable credentials 
A verifiable credential (VC) is defined in [7] as a set of 
one or more tamper resistant claims made by an issuer, 
where each claim asserts a set of properties about a subject. 
The architecture of the VC model is shown in figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1. W3C Verifiable Credentials Architecture [7] 
The subject should create one or more globally unique 
identifiers mediated by a verifiable data registry. The holder 
asks the issuer to create a VC for one or more subjects by 
binding properties to identifiers. The holder is usually, but 
not always, the subject of the verifiable credentials they are 
holding, for example, a parent may hold a child’s VCs. The 
issuer verifies the holder, its right to hold the subject’s VC, 
the identifiers and the properties, and then issues the VC. 
The holder can store the issued VC in its repository for later 
use. Finally, holders combine one or more VCs together (i.e. 
attribute aggregation) to present verifiable presentations to 
verifiers. In this model, VC issuers don’t know the identities 
of the verifiers, which is a significant change from current 
FIM systems. 
B. FIDO Universal Authentication Framework 
The FIDO Alliance has specified the Universal 
Authentication Framework (UAF) for password-less 
authentication [12] using asymmetric encryption on smart 
devices (figure 2). 
All UAF devices contain one or more FIDO 
Authenticators. An authenticator is a secure entity within the 
smart device that can create and store asymmetric key pairs 
and authenticate the user to access the keys via a specific 
method such as fingerprints, PIN, face recognition, etc. All 
FIDO authenticators must be certified and registered with the 
FIDO metadata service, which is managed by the FIDO 
alliance. They all contain an Attestation Private Key inside 
them that is used to certify the public keys they create. 
Attestation key pairs are generated by the 
device/authenticator manufacturer and are inserted into their 
authenticators. The FIDO Alliance recommends that the 
same attestation private key is inserted into around every 
100,000 authenticators to protect the user's privacy. In this 
way, there is no unique ID associated with the user 
(otherwise a unique attestation public key would become a 
globally unique correlating ID for the user). All FIDO 
servers store the attestation public key certificates to validate 
the integrity of the messages. They can retrieve the 
attestation public key certificates from the metadata service. 
Since all FIDO authenticators are uniquely identified by an 
Authenticator Attestation ID (AAID), the FIDO servers can 
limit the authenticator to be used by the user. 
 
Fig. 2. FIDO UAF Architecture [9] 
The FIDO user device creates a new asymmetric key pair 
for each web site the user authenticates to. UAF has adopted 
the Same Origin Policy (SOP) [13] to ensure signed data is 
only transferred between web pages of the same web site i.e. 
the pages have the same origin (same protocol, host and 
port). This helps in preventing cross-site scripting and similar 
attacks, as each private key is used for one site only.  
When the user first contacts a web site (called Relying 
Party - RP) from her FIDO device, the site’s FIDO server 
issues a registration request message to the FIDO client in 
the user’s device, containing its authentication policy. This 
policy lists the FIDO authenticators that the RP accepts. The 
FIDO client asks the user to choose one authenticator that 
matches the policy. Then, the FIDO client calls the chosen 
authenticator via its Authenticator-Specific Module API 
(ASM). The user authenticates to the authenticator and it 
creates a new key pair dedicated to this site (PrivKey4Site, 
PubKey4Site) where PrivKey4Site, PubKey4Site are the 
private and public keys respectively. The key pair is bound to 
the site's origin (i.e. name, port, and protocol) by the 
authenticator, in order to enforce the SOP. The authenticator 
returns the public key to the FIDO server (via the client) 
signed by its attestation private key PrKAtt i.e. 
signPrKAtt{PubKey4Site} where signPrKi{data} means data is 
signed by private key PrKi. The FIDO server can validate the 
signed registration response message using the trusted 
attestation public key and stores the user’s public key in its 
database.  
When the user logs in to the site again, the FIDO server 
sends an authentication request message, containing a 
challenge and its Authentication Policy, to the FIDO client. 
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The client calls the authenticator that has registered with this 
site to respond to the challenge. The authenticator checks the 
site’s origin and activates the private key PrivKey4Site only 
if it matches the stored origin. It then asks the user to 
authenticate via its supported method(s). Once the user has 
authenticated to it, the authenticator signs the challenge with 
the private key and returns the authentication response to the 
site via the client. 
IV. THE UNIVERSAL AUTHENTICATION AND 
AUTHORIZATION FRAMEWORK 
On the one hand, the W3C is only standardizing the data 
model for VCs and no protocols are proposed. On the other 
hand, FIDO UAF only deals with authentication. In this 
section, we present our FIM framework called Universal 
Authentication and Authorization Framework that extends 
the FIDO UAF protocol to implement W3C Verifiable 
Credentials. We first introduce the conceptual model and 
then we describe the implementation. More details about the 
conceptual model and best practice recommendations are 
provided in [15]. 
A. The UAAF conceptual model 
Our FIM model places the user at the centre of the 
identity ecosystem rather than the IdP, and splits omnipotent 
IdPs into small and specialized Attribute Authorities (AA). 
Existing organizations already assert verifiable credentials in 
our daily life and thus they can play the role of an AA. For 
instance, Universities assert diplomas or student status, 
utility companies and the city hall know your name and 
address, the French scuba-diving federation FFESSM 
certifies diving degrees, etc. As a consequence, users can 
provide the SP with verifiable identities by aggregating 
identity attributes from these well-established authoritative 
entities. Based on this observation, we propose our UAAF 
model (figure 3). 
 
Fig. 3. The UAAF model 
First, the user has to register with the AAs she has a 
relationship with (e.g. her city hall, her insurance company, 
her University, etc.). We do not dictate the entire enrollment 
process because AAs already have their own enrollment 
procedure. The main goal of our UAAF enrollment is for the 
AA to link a FIDO public key with the user. In the most 
secure procedure, the user should physically present herself 
to the AA staff for them to validate her physical identity and 
her possession of the FIDO device. It is also possible to send 
a One Time Password (OTP) by regular mail to the user’s 
home as is currently done for credit cards. Whatever the 
procedure, the user will then register her device using the 
FIDO UAF protocol. This consists in generating an 
asymmetric key pair and transmitting the public key to the 
AA (see section III.B). When this step is complete, the AA 
sends the user the list of attributes it can assert for her (see 
figure 3 step R0) through a new message that extends the 
UAF protocol.  
Before making any transaction, the user should register 
its device on the SP website. When it receives a standard 
FIDO registration request, the FIDO authenticator of the 
user’s device creates a new key pair for communicating with 
the SP (step 0 in figure 3) and sends the public key 
(PubKey4SP) to the SP. When the user wants to make a 
transaction (e.g. buy a pizza), the SP replies to the user by 
presenting an authorization policy that indicates which 
attributes are needed for this transaction and the list of 
trusted AAs for each attribute (step 1). The SP should 
prepare its authorization policies beforehand for the various 
services it offers. Each protected URL can have a different 
policy. This allows fine-grained access control. Our 
authorization policy model covers both CNF and DNF 
policies to describe all possible policy combinations [16]. 
The UAAF module on the user's device looks in its database 
to see if the authorization policy can be matched by the 
attributes the user has already selected for asserting by her 
registered AAs. If no matching attributes are found, the 
transaction stops, and indicates to the user which attributes 
are missing. Otherwise, the user selects one AA from the 
SP’s trusted AAs to issue a verifiable credential for each of 
the requested attributes. The UAAF client now performs a 
standard FIDO authentication exchange with the first AA’s 
credential issuing web page, and then sends a new verifiable 
credential request message to the AA. The UAAF module 
asks the authenticator to sign both the AA’s and SP’s public 
keys with the attestation private key i.e. 
ܵ݅݃݊୔୰୧୴୏ୣ୷ಲ೟೟{PubKey4SP, PubKey4AA}, to prove that both 
keys belong to the same user (step 2). Otherwise it would be 
possible for one user to pass on the public key of a second 
user. We employed the FIDO ASM API extension features to 
make this new message compliant with FIDO UAF. In this 
way, the AA doesn’t know anything about the SP the AA is 
visiting. It only knows the user has another public key. 
Finally, the AA returns the set of verifiable credentials to the 
user’s UAAF module (step 3). The format of the credentials 
respects the W3C Verifiable Credential data model. This 
verifiable credential creation process is repeated until the 
user has verifiable credentials for all the attributes requested 
by the SP (e.g. steps 4 and 5). When she has retrieved all the 
verifiable credentials, the user returns them to the SP (step 6) 
in a verifiable presentation. This provides the attribute 
aggregation feature from multiple AAs. The SP can then 
validate the signature of the verifiable credentials and check 
if they match with the authorization policy. If so, the SP 
grants the user access to its protected resource. The SP can 
also ask the user to sign the transaction acceptance (step 7) 
for non-repudiation or user consent purposes. The user can 
sign this transaction using the private key created for this 
specific SP (step8). 
User
University XYZCityHall ABC
Attribute Authorities
...
Service Provider
(2) PubKey4City says: 
I want you to assert 
"The address for PubKey4SP"
PrivKey4City/PubKey4City
PrivKey4Univ/PubKey4Univ
PrivKey4SP/PubKey4SP
ABC
Address (4) PubKey4Univ says: 
I want you to assert that 
"PubKey4SP is student"XYZ
Student
(1) Prove me 
you are student and 
give me a veri• able address
(3) (5)
(6) Addres
s
XYZ
Student
(R0) UAAF registration:
User -> City: I am PubKey4City
City -> User: I can assert "Name"
and "Address"
(R0) UAAF registration:
User -> Univ: I am PubKey4Univ
Univ -> User: I can assert "student"
and  "last diploma"
(0) I am PubKey4SP
(8) I con• rm the transaction
(7) Everything's •ne, 
the credentials are OK
Here is the transaction to sign
PubKey4City PubKey4Univ
PubKey4SP
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B. Implementation 
We implemented the AA and SP servers by extending the 
UAF FIDO server provided by eBay [17] to be compliant 
with our authorization framework. Both AA and SP servers 
are built on the popular Spring framework and follow the 
Model/View/Controller software design pattern. We 
deployed our UAAF models with Spring Data, which 
provides a programming abstraction layer to access data in a 
unified way regardless of the actual data store. This allows us 
to distribute two releases. The "integration" release allows 
administrators to integrate the servers (AA and SP) with their 
existing information system. Administrators can specify their 
own data model and link it to their databases. They also need 
to create a web site and complete the configuration files. The 
drawback of the "integration release" is it requires Spring 
skills making the deployment somewhat difficult if they are 
not present in the company. The “plug-and-play” release 
focuses on making the deployment fast and easy. It provides 
a data model and only requires administrators to create the 
web site and complete the configuration files. However, this 
version does not allow the administrator to integrate the 
servers with their existing databases. Finally, the FIDO 
UAAF client is available on Android (version 6.0 and 
higher) and iOS (version 10.3 and higher). 
 
Fig. 4. The UAAF AA Architecture 
Creating an AA web site entails deploying seven REST 
services, creating a configuration file, and populating a 
database that defines which users are entitled to which 
attributes (figure 4). Three REST services implement the 
standard FIDO UAF protocol:  
• regRequest, issues the UAF Registration Request 
message to the client (FIDO device) when asked for it; 
• authnRequest, issues the UAF Authentication Request 
message to the client when asked for it; 
• uafResponse, receives the client’s response to the above 
messages; either UAF Registration Response containing 
the attested public key from the client, or UAF 
Authentication Response signed by the client’s private 
key. 
Four REST services implement our FIDO authorization 
service:  
• attrList returns the set of attributes the AA is prepared to 
assert for the user (step R0); 
• userSelectedAttrList receives the list of attributes the user 
consents to be issued as credentials (step R0); 
• credentialsToCertify receives the credential request (steps 
2 and 4)  
• and credentials returns the credentials to the client (steps 3 
and 5). 
Our UAAF AA library doesn't manage the first step of 
the initial registration, which is user identification and 
authentication. This gives the AA flexibility to choose the 
most suitable procedure, such as an OTP or Activation Code, 
etc. Once the user is authenticated, the AA web site 
controller must create a transient object to store the user 
session, which links the different TLS connections and 
informs the UAAF AA controller that the userID has been 
authenticated. 
Administration of the database is possible through AA 
Administration REST services (add/modify/remove users, 
add/modify/remove attributes, etc.). Finally, the AA 
administrator can customize the library in a FIDO metadata 
configuration file where she can set: the list of allowed 
Authenticators’ AAIDs, the trusted facet list (in FIDO, a 
trusted facet list states the different identities of a single 
logical application; it is used by the client to apply the SOP), 
the attestation keys, and the path to the AA’s private key to 
sign credentials. 
 
Fig. 5. The UAAF SP Architecture 
The architecture of the SP is similar to that of the AA 
(figure 5). Our FIDO UAAF SP library supplies the three 
FIDO REST services for authentication described above, as 
well as two more REST services for authorization: 
• UAAFPolicyRequest allows the FIDO UAAF client to get 
the authorization policy related to the current resource 
(step 1); 
•  signedUAAFResponse receives the signed credentials 
(step 6). 
The SP web site communicates with the UAAF SP 
library through a transient object of type UAAF-Transaction 
that the SP web site controller must create using our SP 
UAAF API. This object links the different TLS sessions and 
allows the SP web site to give all the information about the 
current transaction/resource access to the UAAF AA library. 
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Finally, the administrator of the SP web site should 
configure, into the SP configuration file, the metadata for 
FIDO authentication (allowed AAIDs, trusted facet list, 
attestation certificates), and FIDO authorization (the path to 
the trusted AAs' certificates and the path to the SP 
Authorization Policy File). 
The SP's Authorization Policy File contains a set of 
policies. Each policy tells the user which alternative sets of 
attributes from which AAs are required to gain access to a 
particular resource or undertake a chosen transaction. This 
allows the site to support the least privilege principle. Each 
policy is defined by a name. The SP web site controller 
decides which policy to send to the client depending on the 
transaction (or resource) chosen by the user. When the 
UAAF SP controller gets the policy name, it sends the 
referenced policy to the user.  
Finally, we implemented our UAAF client on both 
Android (version 6 and above) and iOS (10.1 and above). 
The software architecture on Android implements the FIDO 
ASM as a separate APK packaged application, as suggested 
by the FIDO UAF documentation. The ASM protects the 
private keys in the Android KeyStore system. On iOS, the 
UAAF and the ASM are bundled together in the same app 
due to inter-process communication limitations and private 
keys are stored in the device's secure enclave. Except for 
these technical differences, the core of the UAAF client is 
identical on both platforms. We extended the ASM to certify 
that the authenticator manages two keys. This action is 
required to limit the scope of use of the credentials signed by 
the AA; otherwise, two users could collude and share an 
AA's issued credentials. The ASM API [18] is a JSON-
formatted request/response protocol to communicate with the 
authenticator. The FIDO UAF standard defines six 
predefined request types (“GetInfo”, “Register”, 
“Authenticate”, “Deregister”, “GetRegistrations” and 
“OpenSettings”). However, this standard protocol is also 
extensible because the ASMRequest type contains a field 
dedicated to extensions. As a consequence, we extended the 
“Authenticate” ASMRequest message by using this 
extension field to inform the authenticator to sign two keys 
in order to prove it manages both keys (step 2 in figure 3). 
V. APPLYING OUR FIM SYSTEM TO ONLINE BANKING 
We applied our user-centric FIM system to the bank 
context. We interviewed bank experts at informatique 
Banque Populaire to understand the current process and the 
users’ experience when opening a new bank account online. 
It consists of: 
1) Manually filling in some fields to indicate their name, 
surname, address, etc. 
2) Uploading pdf documents to prove the truthfulness of 
the information previously provided. 
3) Waiting for 4 or 5 days to get their account opened 
because a human operator has to validate the uploaded 
documents. 
This process has several drawbacks. First, it harms the 
users’ experience. The whole process is painful, from 
manually filling in fields, to uploading pdf files using a 
mobile device, and then waiting 4 or 5 days for the 
response. Secondly, users can provide fake documents and 
can fool the manual validation. As a consequence, we 
developed a prototype to show how our system can help the 
bank to fight against identity fraud, improve the trust in their 
clients, speed up the entire process and facilitate the 
development of new businesses and services.  
We started by analyzing the different documents needed 
to open a new bank account. The current process requires 
document-based credentials. However, these documents 
contain much information (i.e. many attributes), not all of it 
being relevant. Thus, we had to interview our partner to 
determine which of the attributes included in the documents 
are really needed. During this analysis, we could also 
determine the existing AAs that are already trusted by the 
bank (see figure 6). 
  
Fig. 6. The “opening a new bank account” use-case 
In our new process, the user starts by registering her 
device on each AA she already knows. For instance, she can 
go to her city hall and register her device using an OTP 
provided by a city official (figure 7(a)). The user is then 
asked to authenticate using the TouchID to create the FIDO 
key pair for the city hall (figure 7(b)). When the city hall 
receives the public key, it sends the list of assertable 
attributes back to the user (see figure 7(c)). 
Now let’s consider the user has registered her device at 
her city hall (here Mairie de Bolmo), an energy supplier 
(here GreenElectricity), her current bank (here ‘my online 
bank’), and her real estate agency (here ImmobCity). She 
connects to the new bank web site to create a new bank 
account. After asking some legal questions, the new bank 
website will start the UAAF process (figure 8(a)). The 
UAAF client of the user then creates a key pair for the new 
bank website and sends the public key to the web site. Then, 
the new bank web site sends its authorization policy to the 
user (figure 8(b)) where it asks for four verifiable credentials:  
• a proof of identity (name/surname) issued by either a 
city hall or the National Gendarmerie; 
• a proof of address issued by either an energy 
supplier, a city hall, an accredited real estate agency, 
the French National Gendarmerie, the French tax 
department or a University; 
• a proof of salary issued by either the French tax 
department or a University; 
• and the IBAN number of the current user’s bank 
account.  
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(a) 
  
          (b)            (c) 
Fig. 7. Screenshots of the enrollment process on the AA “Mairie de 
Bolmo” 
For each requested attribute, the user can select the AA that 
will issue the related verifiable credential (figure 8(c)). The 
UAAF client only presents the intersection between the list 
of registered AAs and the list of AAs trusted by the SP. 
That’s why, the user can only select Mairie de Bolmo or 
ImmobCity in our case (figure 8(c)). Once the AAs are 
selected, the user will generate signed verifiable credential 
requests (figure 9(a)). For each request, the user will be 
asked to authenticate using the TouchID so that the UAAF 
client can use the private key for the respective AA to sign 
the messages. When all the verifiable credentials have been 
retrieved, they are transmitted to the new bank web site. In 
our use-case, the new bank website shows a transaction 
confirmation message (figure 9(b)) after having verified the 
credentials. If accepted, the user signs the transaction 
confirmation using her new bank's private key.  She is then 
redirected to the bank website and can use her new bank 
account (figure 9(c)). 
I. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
We presented in this article the Universal Authentication 
and Authorization Framework. This user-centric and 
decentralized identity management solution gives control of 
digital identities back to the users. In parallel, it reduces the 
power of the IdPs by splitting monolithic IdP entities into 
small AAs, and preventing them, by design, to track users. 
Our system is also more resilient. Indeed, users can obtain 
the same credentials from multiple AAs. This way, the 
impact of an AA closing its service is limited. Finally, our 
system is more secure for SPs that require assurance of 
credentials and for users by removing the need for 
passwords. The whole framework has been implemented 
(Spring servers for AAs and SPs, iOS and Android for the 
users' devices) and applied to opening a new bank account 
online. 
We acknowledge that our system radically transforms the 
current digital FIM ecosystem and the associated business 
model where identities are sold by IdPs. Nevertheless, our 
FIM ecosystem mirrors the trust model which is currently 
deployed by organizations in the physical document-based 
identity model. As a consequence, organizations can use 
their existing business relations to build their digital identity 
federations. 
Our future work will focus on the acceptance of our new 
ecosystem. We have obtained feedback from industrial 
people that have asked for help in managing the transition 
from their currently deployed FIM technologies to our 
vision. As a consequence, we will work on integrating OIDC 
and SAML to our system as a transitional solution while 
preserving the privacy of the users and the trust that SPs have 
in existing attribute providers. 
 
(a) 
          
          (b)            (c) 
Fig. 8. Screenshots of the SP’s authorization policy  
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          (a)            (b) 
 
(c) 
Fig. 9. Screenshots of the verifiable credentials creation and transaction 
confirmation 
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